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The Flower and the Breaking Wheel: Burkean Beauty and Political
Kitsch
C. E. Emmer, Emporia State University, Kansas, USA
Abstract: What is kitsch? The varieties of phenomena which can fall under the name are bewildering. Here, I focus on what
has been called “traditional kitsch,” and argue that it often turns on the emotional effect specifically captured by Edmund
Burke’s concept of “beauty” from his 1757 'A Philosophical Enquiry into the Sublime and Beautiful.' Burkean beauty also
serves to distinguish “traditional kitsch” from other phenomena also often called “kitsch”—namely, entertainment. Although
I argue that Burkean beauty in domestic decoration allows for us to see “traditional kitsch” as resting on natural and even
healthy impulses, I also argue that an all-too-common political function of traditional kitsch directs it to dangerous ends.
Keywords: Beauty, Burke, Camp, Cute, Comfort, Danger, Decoration, Domestic, Home, Ideology, Irony, Kitsch, Political,
Power, Propaganda, Safety, Security, Sublime, Traditional Kitsch
Beauty Reconsidered1
THE LAST FEW years have witnessed anumber of reconsiderations of the place ofbeauty in relation to art. One of the most
prominent is the recent book, The Abuse of
Beauty, by philosopher and art critic Arthur C.
Danto.2 Danto’s main early work had provided the
tools to later show that, though eighteenth- and
nineteenth-century thinkers had seen beauty to be an
essential element of an artwork, beauty in fact has
no necessary relation to whether something qualifies
as an artwork.3This independence of art from beauty,
however, has now freed him to recuperate in The
Abuse of Beauty a certain legitimate place for beauty
in art without the burden of assuming that beauty
was art’s sine qua non.
I plan to do something similar here: to cautiously
rejuvenate a particular idea of beauty, this time in
relation to kitsch. Namely, Edmund Burke’s eight-
eenth-century conception of beauty (from A Philo-
sophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the
Sublime and Beautiful)4 will allow me to clarify a
subset of kitsch which has been called “traditional
kitsch.”5Burkean beauty will allowme to distinguish
this “traditional kitsch” from entertainment and it
will also allowmemount a limited defense of “tradi-
tional kitsch.” At the same time, however, I will ulti-
mately qualify this defense of kitsch with a strong
caveat—also informed by Burke’s aesthetic categor-
ies—about the dangers that “traditional kitsch” al-
most unavoidably invites when, serving political
ends, it is transformed into political kitsch.
Back to Traditional Kitsch
As soon as one opens a discussion of kitsch, the in-
credible variety of phenomena which have been la-
1 This article grew out of a paper I presented at the Symposium on the Arts in Society at New York University (NYC) February 23–25
2007. I thank all who attended for their helpful questions and remarks. In particular, I wish to thank my friend, James DiGiovanna (instructor
of philosophy in the Master’s program at Stony Brook Manhattan, NYC), who has led me to reconsider important aspects of my initial
conceptions of kitsch and who has made many helpful suggestions. Of course, any misconceptions to which I am still subject should not
be attributed to him, nor to those who commented on my paper. Under a similar proviso, I extend my thanks to Professor Monica
Kjellman-Chapin, who made me more familiar with the Thomas Kinkade phenomenon, and to Professor Deborah Gerish of Emporia State
University (Emporia, KS) for her great help in makingmy text more intelligible. Finally, I must extendmy thanks to an anonymous reviewer
who gave pointed criticisms to many parts of this essay and helped me make it clearer.
2 Arthur C. Danto, The Abuse of Beauty: Aesthetics and the Concept of Art, The Paul Carus Lectures 21, (Chicago: Open Court, 2003).
Also arguing for a more contextually aware—and thus more nuanced—approach to beauty is Llewellyn Negrin, “The Contradictory Nature
of our Relation to Beauty in Contemporary Culture,” The International Journal of The Arts in Society 1:3 (2007): 135–140.
3 Arthur C. Danto, The Transfiguration of the Commonplace: A Philosophy of Art (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981). In this
book he had already stated that, as far as beauty and art were concerned, “Making beautiful things is of course an exalted activity, as beauty
is an exalted quality; but aesthetics, as we have so often seen, hardly touches the heart of art and certainly not of great art, which is certainly
not the art that happens to be the most beautiful” (p. 173).
4 Edmund Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry Into the Sublime and the Beautiful [1757/1759], (New York: Penguin Books, 1998/2004).
Burke’s own divisions will be used instead of page numbers.
5 Aleksa Ĉelebonović thematized the term “traditional kitsch” in his essay, “Notes on Traditional Kitsch,” in Gillo Dorfles, Kitsch: The
World of Bad Taste (New York: Bell Publishing, 1969), pp. 280–289. My usage here, at least as far as the referent is concerned, bears
comparison to Ĉelebonović’s.
THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF THE ARTS IN SOCIETY,
VOLUME 2, NUMBER 1, 2007
http://www.arts-journal.com, ISSN 1833-1866
© Common Ground, C. E. Emmer, All Rights Reserved, Permissions: cg-support@commongroundpublishing.com
belled as kitsch forces us to answer the question,
What is meant by kitsch in the first place?6
In its loosest—and, I would contend, least use-
ful—sense, it is simply synonymouswith whatsoever
one considers to bemade or consumed in “bad taste.”
This wider sense, however, has grown from an older,
core meaning: the schmaltzy and sometimes tacky
bric-a-brac that accumulates in displays on kitchen
shelves, on top of parents’ and grandparents’ dress-
ers, on living room walls and on top of living room
television sets, in the nooks and crannies of gardens,
and even on and around office computers. These are
the Ur-kitsch phenomena to which the word always
seems ready to return, and which for that very reason
have been called “traditional kitsch.” The etymology
or history of the word is foggy at best, but the herit-
age of this core meaning can be felt in this etymolo-
gical foray from Gillo Dorfles’ introduction to his
cornerstone anthology on kitsch:
The word kitsch could derive etymologically
from the English ‘sketch’ or, according to other
opinions, from the German verb verkitschen (to
make cheap). According to Giesz (Ludwig
Giesz: Phänomenologie des Kitsches [Rothe,
Heidelberg, 1960] which is without doubt the
most complete on the subject), the word kitsch
could approximately be said to mean ‘artistic
rubbish.’7
In his anthology on kitsch, Dorfles and his collected
authors utilize Hermann Broch’s concept of a
Kitschmensch (the kitsch-person or kitsch attitude)
to greatly expand upon this core meaning of “tradi-
tional kitsch” to include cinema, automobile design,
modern architecture, shopping malls, and tourist re-
sorts. When, in his anthology, Dorfles finally intro-
duces the essay on “traditional kitsch,” the last essay
in the book, he almost has to apologize for having
put off for so long what is, after all, the very home-
land—or Heimat—of kitsch:
There is a traditional—or rather, a so-called
traditional—type of kitsch that has virtually
become a commonplace. All the writings and
publications which have been concerned with
the problem of bad taste usually dwell on this
type, which—though this must be said with the
utmost caution—is probably less dangerous
than the other more insidious forms we have
examined so far. […W]e have preferred to put
it at the end of a book so as to show that it is
relatively unimportant and in a certain sense
inoffensive.8
As can be seen from Dorfles’ remarks, “traditional
kitsch” is what one usually encountered in books on
kitsch,9 andwhat Dorfles saw as the signal advantage
of his anthology was that he had brought minds to
the topic which could push the concept into until
then relatively unexplored—i.e., less “tradition-
al”—realms of kitsch. Even though it was commend-
able to search for untrodden paths, I am afraid that
something might have gotten lost in the all the path-
breaking.
What got lost, then? It is my belief that many
things which have fallen under the rubric of kitsch
would be better understood if seen instead as a form
of entertainment. This holds particularly in the Dor-
fles anthology (which self-consciously expands upon
traditional kitsch) but also in various other kitsch
compendia. In more intellectual contexts generally,
kitsch is practically interchangeable with popular
culture. My contention here is that, within popular
culture (or “kitsch” in its looser sense), there is a
basic difference between two types of phenomena.
And I will argue here that Burke’s conception of
beauty can help us quickly arrive at the heart of that
difference. To be more concrete, the sorts of objects
which Burkean beauty should be able to unite would
include paintings of large-eyed crying children;
snow-globes of cheery or peaceful winter scenes;
pseudo-impressionist landscapes which show warm
scenes of cozy cottages nestled amongst colorful
flower bushes or glowing snowdrifts; billboards for
6 An attempt at a taxonomy of critical treatments of “kitsch” phenomena can be found in C. E. Emmer, “Kitsch Against Modernity,” Art
Criticism 13:1 (1998): 53–80. The present piece liberally draws from, but also revises, that earlier treatment.
7 Dorfles, Kitsch: The World of Bad Taste, p. 10 (punctuation slightly amended). In his anthology’s title article, “Kitsch,” Dorfles goes
on to say that “Even the word kitsch, once used only in Germany (probably because the problem was particularly acute there), has now
spread and is used in the Anglo-Saxon countries as well as in Italy” (p. 15). On a somewhat anecdotal plane, I would have to say that
the greatest preponderance of books on kitsch (at least books with the word “kitsch” in their titles) does appear to be in the German
language.
8 Dorfles, Kitsch: The World of Bad Taste, p. 279.
9 See e.g., Curtis Brown, Star-Spangled Kitsch: An Astounding and Tastelessly Illustrated Exploration of the Bawdy, Gaudy, Shoddy Mass-
Art Culture in This Great Land of Ours (New York: Universe Books, 1975). For a more recent example, see Peter Ward, Kitsch in Sync:
A Consumer’s Guide to Bad Taste (London: Plexus, 1991), which also devotes much space to cinema and fashion, as well as artists’ and
filmmakers’ recycling of popular culture in the “camp” mode. Many of such books float between disdain and celebration. The even more
recent collection, Wayne Hemingway, Just Above the Mantelpiece: Mass-Market Masterpieces (London: Booth-Clibborn Editions, Ltd.,
2000), however, explicitly states, “I have seen [mass-market art] celebrated in a post-modernist ironic way and I have been saddened by
its inclusion in kitsch iconography. Let’s not celebrate it for these reasons. Value deserves to be restored to a genre derided by certain
members of the art elite and respect should be given to the artists whose work broadened the horizons of collecting to reach the working
classes, making this art form available to a wider public than ever before” (pp. 4-5).
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Christian summer camps showing a benevolent
Caucasian Christ assisting a child with his paper
airplane; Norman Rockwell magazine illustrations;
and the typical tchotchkes sold in the many
“Grandma’s craft-basket”-type gift shops found along
highways in conjunction with “family dining.” My
contention is that there is something that holds most
of these together as a group.10
But even if one ultimately does not believe that
what is more “essential” to kitsch is the phenomenon
of traditional kitsch, or even that kitsch is the proper
term for the phenomena in question, what I hope will
have to be conceded (if my following argument
convinces) is that the phenomena here being calling
traditional kitsch and what we could label entertain-
ment are at base two different phenomena, which
therefore should be distinguished from one another.
Without this basic distinction in play, one finds tra-
ditional kitsch items (such as those I’ve just listed)
bound together with the most divergent types of
things—violent video games, mass-produced repro-
ductions of Leonardo and Picasso alike, intellectual
articles from the New Yorker magazine, automotive
tail fins, country music as well as heavy metal, and
summer tourist spots replete with belly-dancing,
water-skiing, and roller coasters.
Before going any further, I should make one thing
clear about what I have in mind when I speak of
kitsch. At base, I will be treating kitsch as an emo-
tional—or at least, subjective—phenomenon. By this
I mean that one and the same object could be kitsch
in one context but not kitsch in another. I will be
using the word kitsch and its correlates to refer to a
single-order intention or attitude toward the product
in question: a simple enjoyment of the “kitsch” object
because its “kitschy” aspects are enjoyed as directly
good. As a consequence, if the same object were
enjoyed for the fact that its “kitschy” aspects were
understood to be in bad taste (precisely because they
were understood to be inferior), we would then not
be faced with kitsch, but rather camp, irony, or some
similar attitude which rests on a feeling or posture
of knowing superiority to the product in question.11
Someone, therefore, who has purchased an angel
figurine from a rummage sale or from an on-line
“collectibles” shop and who enjoys looking at it for
the very reason that they find it to be tacky or taste-
less or atrocious does not exemplify the phenomenon
of kitsch, but rather of camp. Why does this mere
change in attitude make such a difference? In such
a case, the object no longer serves the same function
it did as kitsch.12
Having made that clarification, however, we are
met immediately with another serious problem, one
which rests on the fact that the term kitsch itself is
generally understood to be derogatory. So, unless
the word is meant ironically (and in that case, we
would be discussing camp, or arch hip, etc.), it ap-
pears the word in the sense I am using can only be
applied from the “outside,” since (given the word’s
usual derogatory sense) a person directly enjoying
kitsch would not call it kitsch, but rather beautiful,
wonderful, charming, sweet, nice, or some similar
approbative term. Generally speaking, the term
“kitsch” is used to show disapproval of someone
else’s approval or disapproval of the possibility that
something could merit approval. For the most part
in this piece, however, I shall not be devoting time
to discussing the artistic or aesthetic merits or demer-
its of the “kitsch” items in question. Instead I shall
devote my time to revealing the basic functions that
these objects are meant to fulfill, and to the question
of whether those functions help us or harm us. Fi-
nally, given that, in the following I will be using a
certain sense of beauty—namely, Edmund Burke’s
concept of beauty—to clarify the heart of traditional
kitsch, I will often speak of Burkean beauty instead
of using the term traditional kitsch.13
Burkean Beauty
The concept of “beauty” can be applied with as much
variety as that of “kitsch”—not merely in everyday
contexts, but in more academic treatments, as well.
10 I don’t ultimately believe that a definition can be provided which would capture all of traditional kitsch—the particular stories and per-
sonal idiosyncrasies which help select what ends up on kitchen shelves and on top of televisions would make such a definition impossible.
Nonetheless, as I shall presently explain in more detail, I do believe that many of them serve a common function.
11 Dorfles refers to “the use by a culturally sophisticated public, of elements which are decidedly kitsch (furniture, furnishings and pictures
of course, statues, etc.) but which are redeemed by the particular attitude that likes to be called ‘camp,’ itself, in a way, a rival to kitsch”
and goes on to quote Susan Sontag’s remark that “Many examples of camp from a ‘serious’ viewpoint are bad art or kitsch. Not all, however.
Not only is camp not necessarily bad art; there are even works of art which can be considered camp … and even deserve the most serious
admiration.” Kitsch: The World of Bad Taste, p. 291–292, citing Susan Sontag, “Notes on Camp,” in Against Interpretation: And Other
Essays, (New York: Picador/Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 2001), p. 278 (citation amended). I certainly have no illusions that, with only this
short mention, the concept of “camp” (or indeed, Sontag’s particular concept) has been done justice; the point is simply that the “kitsch”
phenomena I have in mind do not involve the sort of indirect, inverting, self-consciously referential structure encountered in camp and
irony.
12 To cite a more mundane but analogous opposition, someone who penetrates the stomach of another with a scalpel in order to perform
life-saving surgery is not carrying out the same act as someone who penetrates the stomach of another with a scalpel in order to murder
them, even though both undeniably plunge a scalpel into another’s stomach.
13 I would hope to be able to say, with Burke, “I am in little pain whether any body choses to follow the name I give […] or not, provided
he allows that what I dispose under different heads are in reality different things in nature. The use I make of the words may be blamed as
too confined or too extended; my meaning cannot well be misunderstood.” Philosophical Enquiry, preface to the first edition.
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In the context of discussing kitsch, however, I believe
that Edmund Burke’s treatment of beauty can assist
us in two ways. The first goes to Burke’s general
distinction between the beautiful and the sublime.
In his Philosophical Enquiry, Burke wrote that he
observed that the ideas of the sublime and the
beautiful were frequently confounded; and that
both were indiscriminately applied to things
greatly differing, and sometimes of natures
directly opposite. Even Longinus, in his incom-
parable discourse upon a part of this subject,
has comprehended things extremely repugnant
to each other, under the common name of the
Sublime. The abuse of the word Beauty, has
been still more general, and attended with still
worse consequences.14
The same could be said of the term “kitsch”: the
variety of phenomena that fall under the term is so
great that even phenomena of essentially opposed
natures are found collected together, nestled next to
each other in the same conceptual “kitsch” display
cabinet.
The second way that Burke’s treatment of beauty
can clarify kitsch relates to the first. For Burke’s
particular conception of beauty will help to expose
a most basic divide among supposedly similar
“kitsch” phenomena. How does Burke conceive of
beauty, then? Focusing on our bodily or animal as-
pect, he divides the “ideas capable of making a
powerful impression on the mind” into two basic
types, those relevant to self-preservation and those
relevant to society.15 The root of self-preservation,
turning on alterations of pain in “modifications” (or
a “mode”) of terror, delivers the feeling of the sub-
lime, whereas the root of social connection, pleasure,
delivers the feeling of the beautiful. More specific-
ally, Burke writes that beauty is
a social quality; for where women andmen, and
not only they, but when other animals give us
a sense of joy and pleasure in beholding them,
(and there are many that do so) they inspire us
with sentiments of tenderness and affection to-
wards their persons; we like to have them near
us, and we enter willingly into a kind of relation
with them.16
Though he does say that beautiful objects—by
definition—inspire the passion of love, and though
he does recognize a natural urge which drives hu-
mans (and other animals) to procreate, the two should
not be confused. He distinguishes love from mere
lust (or, as he also calls it, desire):
We shall have a strong desire for a woman of
no remarkable beauty; whilst the greatest beauty
in men, or in other animals, though it causes
love, yet excites nothing at all of desire. Which
shews that beauty, and the passion caused by
beauty, which I call love, is different from de-
sire…17
Turning to the emotional or bodily influence in
question, Burke explains that, in being affected by
a beautiful object,
the mouth is a little opened, and the breath
drawn slowly, with now and then a sigh: the
whole body is composed, and the hands fall idly
to the sides. All this is accompanied with an
inward sense of melting and languor. […]Who
is a stranger to that manner of expression so
common in all times and in all countries, of
being softened, relaxed, enervated, dissolved,
melted away by pleasure?”18
Without being burdened by Burke’s specific
physiological explanations of this process, or the
specific physical qualities he takes to be characterist-
ic of beautiful objects, we may focus on the type of
attitude he describes: a sense of release, relaxation,
comfort, and sweetness—this is emotional core of
Burkean beauty. Ultimately, Burke takes these feel-
ings to foster a healthy, mutually supportive relation-
ship with one’s society and fellows.
The precise type of beauty in question here should
not be overlooked: Burke’s idea of “beauty” is actu-
ally much closer to what we today would just as often
call “pretty” or “cute” (Burke himself discusses
beauty in terms of “sweetness,” “tenderness,” and
“affection”)—something that evokes some type of
calm, reassuring relaxation and repose.19 As Danto
remarks, in words that strikingly parallel Burke’s
discussion of beauty, “Cuteness in a work of art,
exactly as in life, is a way of getting us to feel warm
and protective toward what is seen to possess it.”20
14 Philosophical Enquiry, preface to the first edition.
15 Philosophical Enquiry, Part I, Sect. VI and passim.
16 Philosophical Enquiry, Part I, Sect. X.
17 Philosophical Enquiry, Part III, Sect. I.
18 Philosophical Enquiry, Part IV, Sect. XIX.
19 The “prettiness”—or “cuteness”—of Burkean beauty first hit me as I was leafing through Hartwig Schmidt’s essay, “Hübschheit und
Schönheit,” on the difference between the “beautiful” and the “pretty”; the basic distinction in his essay pushed me to think more clearly
about the specific type of beauty which Burke had in mind. “Hübschheit und Schönheit: Zur Ästhetik leibhaftiger Individualität,” in his
collection Grausamkeit und andere Lüste: Ethische Essays (Berlin: Berliner Debatte Wissenschaftsverlag, 1998), pp. 18–43.
20 Danto, The Abuse of Beauty, p. 59.
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Upon reflection, it can be seen that the feelings at
issue in Burkean beauty are the feelings at the heart
of traditional kitsch. They are what the examples of
traditional kitsch we saw earlier are about: repose,
melting release, healing and retreat, comfort, sweet-
ness, kindness, sanctuary. Danto speaks of artistic
beauty as part of the creation of a Garden of Eden
which “put[s] the harshness of world at a distance”
and, in a higher mode, as a means of “put[ting] suf-
fering in a philosophical perspective.”21 And these
feelings or these aims serve to distinguish what is
here being referred to as “traditional kitsch” from
many of the other phenomena also called kitsch, but
which might be better referred to as types of enter-
tainment: amusement park rides, video games, per-
formances by the glam-rock band KISS, science
fiction action movies, etc. These are about excite-
ment, thrill-seeking, and high energy diversion—phe-
nomena in some ways much more akin to Burke’s
idea of the sublime—and not repose. Granted, these
two classes, that of “traditional kitsch” (Burkean
beauty) and that of entertainment (something more
akin to Burke’s sublime) do not exhaust the incred-
ible abundance of phenomena labelled as “kitsch,”
but with these two classes, one has a grasp of a
central divide.22
Aswe have seen, for Burke the feelings connected
to the beautiful are social. These are healthy feelings
necessary to the preservation and maintenance of
society and furthermore necessary to the establish-
ment of a good life amongst our fellow living be-
ings.23Here it might be noted that both Burke’s idea
of the sublime and the beautiful imply a certain
power differential.24 The Burkean sublime involves
moderated terror, a relation to something which
generates feelings connected to things or forces more
powerful than oneself, something which could
threaten one’s safety or life itself, should it come to
that. It is not actual panic, but a fear which is in one
way or another tempered—the feeling of the sublime
is a type of what Burke calls delight, a sort of relief
(though not a positive pleasure) at the lessening of,
or at having a perceptible distance from, pain or
danger.25
What is perhaps not so often underscored is the
fact that Burkean beauty also involves at least an
implied power differential: generally, that which is
beautiful in Burke’s conception is something which
one wants to bring closer so that one may protect
and care for it. And this is part of its health, I would
argue: a healthy society is one which cares for those
in need, those who, for whatever reason, may require
our assistance and protection.26 When a home is
provided with Burkean beauty, it serves to create a
space of retreat, comfort, stasis, and sanctuary. (And
the domestic sphere is, as we have seen, the natural
locus of traditional kitsch.) It seems to follow that
Burkean beauty (or traditional kitsch) arguably plays
21 Danto, The Abuse of Beauty, p. 115.
22 This divide between two basic classes, based on a divide between two basic types of function, also does not rule out the possibility that
some products might combine these functions, particularly temporally structured ones, such as music, narrative, theater, or film (examples
might be anime or the Ewoks of the Star Wars series). Given that Burke argues that a person can simultaneously experience pleasure and
pain, it is not surprising that he also admits that some product might combine both the beautiful and the sublime, though the combination
would be difficult to pull off effectively, and would not prove that the beautiful and the sublime were the same thing. Philosophical Enquiry,
Part III, Sects. XIII and XXVII.
23 Burke notes that the passions “of society…may be divided into two sorts. I. The society of the sexes, which answers to the purposes of
propagation; and next, that more general society, which we have with men and with other animals.” Philosophical Enquiry, Part I, Sect.
VIII. In a certain sense Burke could be read as ascribing to providence a kind of overflowing generosity; Burke certainly sees these social
connections as serving human ends. But, as he notes, it carries us even into kind relations to some of our fellow (non-human) animals.
24 The presence of this power differential in Burke’s theory receives treatment in Steven Cresap, “Sublime Politics: On the Uses of an
Aesthetics of Terror,” Clio 19:2 (Winter 1990): 111–125. Cresap also notes the all-but-explicit gender identification (men lend themselves
to sublimity, women to beauty) in Burke’s text (pp. 120–121); see e.g., Burke, Philosophical Enquiry, Part III, Sect. IX. The corresponding
trope in Immanuel Kant’s 1764 Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime as well as in contemporary discussions of
kitsch is discussed briefly in Emmer, “Kitsch against Modernity,” p. 58.
25 Philosophical Enquiry, Part I, Sect. IV.
26One could compare KarlMarx the “humanist” here, who observes that a society can be judged by how it treats those who have been assigned
a subservient position:
In the relationship to woman, as the plunder and handmaid of communal lust, is made explicit the infinite degradation in which the
human being exists for itself, for the secret of this relationship has its unambiguous, decisive, revealed, exposed expression in the re-
lationship between man and woman and in the way that the immediate, natural species relationship is seized. The immediate, natural,
necessary relationship between human being and human being is the relationship of man to woman. … From this relationship one can
thus judge the entire level of development of human being.
Karl Marx, Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte, “Privateigentum und Kommunismus” [Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of
1844, “Private Property and Communism”] No. 1 (my translation). In Marx and Engels,Werke, Ergänzungsband, 1. Teil, S.465–588, Dietz
Verlag, Berlin (DDR), 1968, p. 535 (online transcription of German text by Einde O'Callaghan for <www.marxists.org>). Philosopher
John Rawls’s idea of a “veil of ignorance,” resting not on a Marxian foundation, but rather a Kantian one, leads to strikingly similar con-
clusions regarding the treatment of those in a subservient role. See the Rawls section of Stuart White’s “Social Minimum,” in the Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2004 edition).
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a part in meeting a basic, human need for a healthy
domestic space,27 one which not only provides
comfort and security, but does so in part through
fostering feelings of sympathy, compassion, and
kindness in the dweller. And, ideally, one’s domestic
rejuvenation of these emotional capacities allows
one to care for others.
Ambivalent Kitsch: Bob Ross vs.
Thomas Kinkade
Kitsch is not always so comforting. Indeed, some
kitschographers have attacked kitsch as purely,
diabolically vile. The moral theologian Richard
Egenter, for example, saw Christian kitsch as an in-
strument of Satan,28 whereas the literary theorist
Hermann Broch characterized the maker of kitsch
as “an ethically depraved person, a criminal who
desires the radically evil.”29 Kitsch, as has just been
argued, can be defended against such extreme reac-
tions. But the tides have turned, it seems, for kitsch.
Many of the more recent discussions of kitsch and
popular culture generally (especially in the 1980s
and 1990s) are unselfconsciously celebratory—they
call for gleeful consumption. That celebratory ex-
treme, too, has come to be questioned.30 The follow-
ing discussion will place this essay within those ap-
proaches that find in kitsch both needed balm and
lurking danger.
Kitsch is an inherently ambivalent phenomenon.
From early on, I have noted in myself the conflicting
attitudes of dismissiveness as well as uncritical im-
mersion, and, in my earlier work, I made a case for
kitsch’s place in the home as part of a natural and
healthy defense mechanism (not unlike the case I
have just made with the assistance of Burke). I fo-
cused then on the do-it-yourself landscape paintings
of Bob Ross’s television program, The Joy of Paint-
ing TM, because both his paintings and his television
show lend themselves so well to the creation of do-
mestic sanctuary and because (as David Halle has
shown) landscapes play a central role in actual do-
mestic sanctuaries. In the interim, however, I came
to realize that, even though both Bob Ross and
Thomas Kinkade paint “traditional kitsch” land-
scapes, those landscapes are not the same.31And the
difference between them is important—important
enough that we should spend some time looking into
their respective works in more detail. We shall ulti-
mately be rewarded for this by a deeper understand-
ing of the different functions that traditional kitsch
can carry out.
For many years, Bob Ross (1942–1995) appeared
on PBS stations across the United States to host his
show, The Joy of Painting (selected episodes are still
being broadcast onmany PBS stations under the title,
The Best of the Joy of Painting TM). His company,
Bob Ross Inc., offers painting supplies, classes with
certified instructors, and instructional materials such
as books and DVDs.32 In the half-hour broadcasts
of his do-it-yourself series, he starts with an empty
canvas and ends with a completed painting, often
depicting amountain lake surrounded by trees.While
he paints, he explains to the viewer how to make
27 Here there is significant overlap with Emmer, “Kitsch against Modernity,” which however focused not merely on kitsch’s ability to
provide a perceived connection to stasis and sanctuary, but also to tradition and nature. I should add (drawing again from “Kitsch against
Modernity”) that the status of the home as a locus of retreat and sanctuary for the dweller has been empirically verified by David Halle’s
Inside Culture, and that the connected universal preference for landscapes he documented (independently confirmed by Komar andMelamid)
has recently been re-confirmed by Halle in studies he and Elisabeth Tiso are carrying out in New York City art galleries in the Chelsea
district of Manhattan, NYC. David Halle, Inside Culture: Art and Class in the American Home (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1986) and David Halle and Elisabeth Tiso, “The Structure of Contemporary Art: The Case of Chelsea in New York City,” paper presented
at the International Symposium on the Arts in Society (February 23–25, 2007 at the Tisch School of the Arts at New York University,
NYC).
28 Richard Egenter, The Desecration of Christ, ed. Nicolete Gray, trans. Edward Quinn (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1967).
29 Hermann Broch, Schriften zur Literatur 2: Theorie, ed. Paul Michael Lützeler (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1975) p. 95 (my
translation). Selections from Broch’s writing on kitsch are translated into English in Gillo Dorfles, Kitsch: The World of Bad Taste.
30 An interesting treatment of some of these issues is Jonathan E. Schroeder, “Aesthetics Awry: The Painter of Light  and the Commodific-
ation of Artistic Values,”Consumption, Markets and Culture 9:2 (June 2006): 87–99. Schroeder contends that traditional aesthetic categories
have blinded experts in marketing, of all people, to the crass operation of marketing on the part of Thomas Kinkade. On the other hand,
his argument also avoids the mistaken notion that marketing is inoperative in “high art” contexts. For more on market forces and commer-
cialism in the British art world, see Julian Stallabrass,High Art Lite: British Art in the 1990s (Verso Books, 1999). Schroeder cites Stallabrass,
Art Incorporated: The Story of Contemporary Art. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). Of course an American locus classicus for
questions of art and commercialism is Clement Greenberg’s 1939 essay, “Avant-Garde and Kitsch,” reproduced in part in Dorfles, Kitsch:
The World of Bad Taste. Clement Greenberg, “Avant-Garde and Kitsch,” in Art and Culture: Critical Essays (Boston: Beacon Press, 1961),
pp. 3–21 (Dorfles, pp. 116–126 = parts III–IV of Greenberg’s essay). Stallabrass could be seen as carrying forward Greenberg’s concern
with the artist’s attachment to the elite through “an umbilical cord of gold.”
31 It was especially Susan Orlean’s account of Thomas Kinkade’s landscape paintings that re-awoke me from my kitschy slumber: Susan
Orlean, “Art for Everybody: Thomas Kinkade, America’s Most Profitable Artist,” The New Yorker (October 15, 2001): 124–146.
32 Images of Bob Ross’s paintings, as well as numerous products and further information, can be found online at <www.bobross.com>. A
precursor to Bob Ross was William (“Bill”) Alexander (1915–1997), another television painter, whose own show was The Art of William
Alexander (also The Magic of Oil Painting), and who developed some of the painting techniques used by Bob Ross. The Alexander Art
Corporation also offers classes (“Alexander Seminars”) with certified instructors. See <www.alexanderart.com> online for more information
and images of paintings. Robert Warren is another television painter descended from Alexander. Images of his work, products, and classes
can be found online at <www.robertwarrenartloft.com>. All three artists have had or do have painting shows on PBS. More recently (as
of October, 2006, on PBS member stationWCEU-Channel 15 in Daytona Beach), Morris Wiener has also started a Bob Ross-inspired PBS
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their own version of the painting he is making, all
the while speaking in a warm, soothing voice. As
one of his signature contributions, he refers to the
trees, rocks, clouds, and other features he paints as
“happy little trees” or a mountain which “lives right
here,” giving all parts of the painting (and the paint-
ing process) a non-threatening, comforting atmo-
sphere.33 He reassures the viewer that, if they are
trying to make a painting, too, they should not
worry—mistakes usually work right into the painting
as “happy accidents.” Simply seen as a television
show—that is, even for the viewer who has no inten-
tion of ever purchasing painting supplies and trying
their hand at painting—The Joy of Painting has a
very reassuring, calming, even therapeutic effect.34
Now let us turn to Thomas Kinkade, who at first sight
might seem to be making products essentially the
same as Bob Ross’s. As we shall see presently,
Kinkade’s output has an importantly different char-
acter.
Thomas Kinkade, the “painter, best-selling author,
inspirational speaker, CEO, real estate developer”35
and self-proclaimed Painter of LightTM, is famous
for his paintings of cozy cottages, glowing with his
trademark light effect. Unlike Bob Ross, Kinkade is
not seen as a television advocate of do-it-yourself
painting: consumers of his work purchase expensive
reproductions of his paintings which mimic the tex-
ture of a painting.36 These reproductions are distrib-
uted through his chain of Thomas Kinkade Signature
Galleries, located in shopping malls across North
America and Europe.37 The paintings can also be
given special airbrushed accents by specially trained
“highlighters” whomake appearances at his galleries
during a “Master Highlighter Event.”38 Kinkade’s
paintings often represent his well-known cottages
but also depict other scenes, such as lighthouses,
bridges, or even American flags such as those in his
“Flags Over America” series. One, America’s Pride,
shows anAmerican flag in front of theWhite House;
another, Light of Freedom, an American flag in front
of a New York City skyline.39 Kinkade’s company
produces (or licenses) not only reproductions of his
paintings, but also jewelry and sculpture, all the way
up to gated communitiesmarketed under the Kinkade
brand.
He bills himself explicitly as a Christian artist,
and many of his sculptures have overtly Christian
themes. His licensed “collectible,” Nativity Tree:
Glory to The Newborn King Christmas Tree, avail-
able from Hawthorne Village, is a rather jumbled,
electrically lit Christmas tree wrapped by a spiral
footpath dotted with scenes from the nativity story,
incorporating over 40 characters and playing the tune
of “Silent Night.” Another internally lit mass-pro-
duced sculpture, Faith Mountain (labelled oddly as
“Religious Christian Home Decor”), also available
from Hawthorne Village, is a cone-shaped “moun-
tain” which looks more like another Christmas tree
than most natural mountains, sporting a mix of
glowing Middle-Eastern buildings and scenes from
the Stations of the Cross (the advertising copy pro-
claims that “With each beautifully sculpted scene,
you can almost feel Jesus’ love, faith, and
strength”).40 And there is the Noah’s Ark figurine
collection available from Hawthorne Village, a fat
brown ship engraved with animal scenes and filled
with removable pairs of animal figurines. There are
many other Kinkade “collectibles” to choose from,
such as the Thomas Kinkade “Light of Peace” Col-
lectable Lighthouse music box available from Ar-
dleigh Elliott (a replica of a gas lamp, internally lit,
filled with a three-dimensional lighthouse scene,
which plays “Somewhere Out There”), or the
Thomas Kinkade Beauty in Flight “Garden of
Prayer” Hummingbird, from the “Wall Decor Art
painting show, Painting with Morris. See Tanya Perez-Brennan, “Deltona Painter Takes to Airwaves: Like His TV Mentor Bob Ross,
Morris Wiener Brings Art to PBS,” Orlando Sentinel, Florida (Oct. 26, 2006).
33 The phrase is so characteristic that Bob Ross, Inc., offers a number of t-shirts festooned with the phrase, “Happy Trees,” coupled with
a picture of Bob Ross, usually working on a painting.
34 Indeed, I am informed that Bob Ross’s program, Joy of Painting, was a staple in the lounge of a ward in Building 40 of the Creedmoor
Psychiatric Center in Queens, NYC, circa 2001. Thanks to Tim Noe, who was a MHTA (Mental Hygiene Therapist Assistant) there at the
time.
35 I owe the string of honorifics to Schroeder, “Aesthetics Awry,” p. 87.
36 Orlean’s “Art for Everybody” mentions a lithographic Kinkade reproduction, Julianne's Cottage, which sold for hundreds of dollars
(US) initially but, having traded hands a number of times, fetches close to US $4,000. She reports that a reproduction given highlights by
Kinkade himself (a “Master Edition”) can sell for US $34,000. For a reproduction of a painting of a house, one could almost purchase a
very modest home. Kinkade has come out with some do-it-yourself products aimed at children, but those products are very peripheral to
his output and stylistically unusual.
37 According to Schroeder’s recent account, Kinkade’s chain has 350 Signature Galleries. Schroeder, “Aesthetics Awry,” p. 90.
38 See Orlean, “Art for Everybody.”
39 If one observes reproductions of both paintings as the same time, it becomes evident that the flags in each of these two paintings are
perfect copies of each other, right down to their particular pattern of ripples. It is true that not all of Kinkade’s paintings are hyper-American:
in a move not unlike Stephen King’s writing novels under the name of Richard Bachman, Kinkade has painted under the pseudonym—or
“brush name”—Robert Girrard, a fictional French painter who prefers impressionist-inspired rainy European street scenes and depictions
of the sun-lit European countryside.
40 In his essay on traditional kitsch, Ĉelebonović’s remarks on the popularity of traditional kitsch include such internally lit sculptures:
“We need only walk through the streets of Venice and pass by the useless kiosks offering plastic or metal SanMarco campaniles and gondolas
of all sizes lit by electric lanterns.” “Notes on Traditional Kitsch,” in Dorfles, Kitsch: The World of Bad Taste, p. 288.
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Collection,” available from the Bradford Exchange,
a bas-relief sculpture of a hummingbird with details
from a Kinkade garden scene painting reproduced
on its open wings.41
Both Bob Ross and Thomas Kinkade made suc-
cessful businesses out of painting, but there is an
important difference between the two (not merely
that Thomas Kinkade has generated much more in-
come).42 Bob Ross’s The Joy of Painting, as I see it,
is about combining self-reliance (its “do-it-yourself”
aspect) and the creation of a personal area of retreat
in one’s home. Kinkade, on the other hand, though
contributing to creating a domestic retreat, weds
consumerism with Christianity and patriotism
through a traditional kitsch (or Burkean beauty) that
I will argue ultimately assists in hiding America’s
abuse of humanity. Kinkade’s kind of traditional
kitsch, I think, shows us a sort of dangerous kitsch
common in the United States. There are certainly
religious elements to Bob Ross’s The Joy of Paint-
ing—he ends his broadcast with the words, “Happy
painting, and God bless,” for example—but The Joy
of Painting is simply not aggressively Christian and
patriotic in the way that Kinkade’s output is.43
A second difference between Bob Ross and
Thomas Kinkade is that Kinkade’s product, when
considered in its entire variety and totality, is poten-
tially life-engulfing. The Kinkade brand extends not
merely to reproduced paintings and “collectibles,”
but to almost everything one could have in one’s
home, including the home itself. One canmake one’s
entire life, away from work and shopping, a “time-
less” Kinkade “moment.” For the person who con-
sumes all of Kinkade, Kinkade can be all-consuming.
One may perhaps debate whether the differences
between the Bob Ross and Kinkade are ultimately
quantitative or qualitative, but with Kinkade, it has
to be admitted that the quantitative differences are
so great that one has entered new territory.
The Danger of Burkean Beauty: Political
Kitsch44
Let us step back for a moment and return to the sig-
nificance of Burke’s conception of beauty. Burkean
beauty can be understood as fostering a sort of
common, decent kindness that humans need to share
with one another and live within. However, the cur-
rent US administration under GeorgeW. Bush keeps
US citizens—classified as “unlawful com-
batants”—under indefinite solitary confinement
without access to a lawyer, or abuses and tortures
foreign detainees in Guantánamo, Cuba, or Abu
Ghraib, Iraq.45And an essential part of creating that
world of isolation, torture, and abuse is to first re-
move from them all beauty, which means: all com-
fort, all social connection, all sanctuary.46 The fact
that the United States is systematically eliminating
beauty, in order to “soften up” real people for an
even worse fate, is something many Americans
would rather not think about.
I have argued above that some traditional kitsch
can have a justifiable place as a part of creating a
domestic space where the dweller feels protected
and can find some sort of rejuvenation of healthy
social feeling. But some forms of kitsch are not
simply means for producing a domestic zone of
safety; they function not merely to maintain beauty
in the home but also to block one’s knowledge of the
destruction of beauty outside of one’s home. Perhaps
an example might help make that last assertion more
intelligible.
One sculpture—or rather, figurine—is the avatar
of the sort of kitsch-assisted veiling function that I
have in mind. It is a small “collectible” approxim-
ately four inches tall distributed as part of the
Hamilton Collection under the title Lord Bless This
41 For Ĉelebonović, such functional mish-mashes are emblematic of much traditional kitsch. The caption for two of his essay’s illustrations
states that “The beer-mug-cum-tower and the tray with the pseudo-lace design are two examples of a type of kitsch which have remained
unchanged for more than half a century.” “Notes on Traditional Kitsch,” p. 281. The Kinkade titles and copy were retrieved from the
<www.collectiblestoday.com> website. For more on the aesthetics of collecting, see Kevin Melchionne, “Collecting as an Art,” Philosophy
and Literature 23:1 (April 1999): 148–156.
42 According to Schroeder, “One in twenty American homes proudly displays a Kinkade art-based product; his sales reached $131 million
in 2001.” Schroeder, “Aesthetics Awry,” p. 90.
43 Schroeder writes that “Many [of Kinkade’s paintings] are religious, in a light-handed way,” but by this he simply means “no crucifixions
here.” Schroeder, “Aesthetics Awry,” pp. 93–94. But this absence of crucifixions actually has more to do with the fact that Schroeder is
discussing Kinkade’s paintings, which, as he notes, are depopulated. As we have already seen, Kinkade’s licensed “collectibles” do depict
the Via Dolorosa, albeit by no means in any way approaching the treatment of the same theme by Mel Gibson’s blood-soaked The Passion
of the Christ (2004). Again, Gibson’s gory spectacle would fit better under the class of entertainment and bear more kinship with Burke’s
sublime. For a wider contextual discussion of why people decorate their homes with depopulated landscapes, see David Halle, Inside Culture.
44My discussion here focuses primarily on political functions for Burkean beauty, not the Burkean sublime. For a perceptive and stimulating
discussion of political functions for the Burkean sublime, see Cresap, “Sublime Politics.” In the present article, I am using a somewhat
streamlined version of Burke’s concept of the beautiful, whereas Cresap’s article, instead of passing over inconsistencies, combs Burke’s
theory for internal contradictions that might indicate hidden agendas or overlooked drawbacks to Burke’s approach.
45 Out of many potential sources, a particularly striking account is given in the report by Human Rights Watch under the title “Torture in
Iraq,” The New York Review of Books 52:17 (November 3, 2005).
46 Engendering the Burkean sublime is also taking place in such contexts (see e.g., Burke, Philosophical Enquiry, Part II, Sect. VI), but,
as stated earlier, my focus here is Burkean beauty.
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Defender of Freedom.47 Judging from the photograph
online, it appears that a fuller title is actually part of
the figurine itself, written in tall blue letters across
the front of its base: Lord Bless This Defender Of
Freedom / And Keep Him Safe In Your Hands. The
figurine itself, photographed in front of a deep blue
background, presents a Caucasian soldier standing
within a pair of monumental, transparent hands, as
if cupped from behind by them, so that presum-
ably—from the “God’s-eye perspective”—he is su-
pine in them. The soldier wears desert camouflage
and black boots; the Kevlar  helmet strapped on his
head is also in desert camouflage, and centered in
its front are a pair of black ballistic goggles with a
yellow lens. On his back he wears a green rucksack,
the straps of which are visible from the front. The
only element breaking the symmetry of the sculpture
(other than an item on his belt, possibly a canteen or
ammunition pouch) is a black military rifle (appar-
ently an M-16), held flat against his body with both
hands (the “ready” position), pointing down slightly
to his left.
One crucial feature is required to grasp the full
effect of the figurine, however: the soldier is infant-
ilized. He is represented as a very young boy, with
a large, round head (his body is less than three heads
tall), large eyes, exaggerated eyelashes, tiny nose
and mouth, short legs, large feet, and short, stubby
fingers.Most of the details of the sculpture have been
rounded and smoothened. The expression on his face
does not suggest that he is defending anything. To
the contrary: instead of appearing to be keeping
lookout, his face presents us with a blank, wide-eyed
stare. His mouth is curved into a gentle smile. His
demeanor is more inviting than threatening. It seems
to suggest he is waiting to be petted or offered a
cookie.
The website copy explains to the prospective
customer that
[n]o matter where his mission takes him, he’ll
never be beyond the reach of God’s protection.
As the bravemembers of the U.S. military head
out to defend our freedom, it’s comforting to
know that each one is sheltered in the loving
hands of God. Keep this radiant tribute near as
a brilliant reminder of all those who proudly
serve our country. Meticulously crafted by
hand, this limited-edition Hamilton Collection
collectible figurine is filled with authentic de-
tails. Please hurry to order now.
This figurine is the iconographic epitome of what
we might call “political kitsch”: that traditional
kitsch, that Burkean beauty, which serves the func-
tion of replacing not only American casualties and
war-wounded but also those kidnapped, tortured, or
killed in the United States’ foreign “adventures.” All
the consequences of American militarism and em-
pire-building disappear in a decontextualized reli-
gious veil of cuteness: a gun snuggled in sanctified
cotton candy. The distance that has been travelled
simply in religious terms can easily be seen by
comparing this image of God’s hands to that of the
New Testament: there it is not an adorable, clean
little boy, but instead a battered, bloody torture vic-
tim who cries to the heavens and says, “Father, into
your hands I commend my spirit” (Luke 23:46).48
Kinkade and Political Kitsch
At heart here is the difference between a domestic
function and a wider, political function for traditional
kitsch. Traditional kitsch that takes on this wider
political function is more obvious in the case of
overtly political products, such as advertising cam-
paigns and video spots for political candidates.49Yet
“merely” domestic decoration may also have a
greater or lesser involvement in the world outside of
the home. In the case of the Lord Bless This Defender
of Freedom figurine, a miniature explicitly stated to
47 I became aware of the figurine through numerous blogs which remarked on it when it came out. An archived image I was able to retrieve
dated it to still be on sale on <www.collectiblestoday.com> as of April, 2003, but according to that website, it is now completely sold out.
To locate an image of it online, use a search engine to find web pages containing the collectible’s item number (0912316001) or its short
title, Lord Bless This Defender of Freedom.
48My discussion of political kitsch does not preclude a political use of the sublime—indeed, the two may be used in tandem—but my focus
in this essay is the Burkean idea of beauty. Certainly Mel Gibson’s The Passion of the Christ (something I would for the most part classify
as a form of entertainment, insofar as it is clearly meant to excite, disturb, and upset the viewer through fear and pity) would be a possible
candidate for a political use of the Burkean sublime. Cresap’s “Sublime Politics” can again be recommended in this relation. For more on
some of the numerous agendas which Gibson’s film pursued (most of them political to a lesser or greater degree), see the articles byMargaret
Mitchell et al. published under the collective title, “Perspectives on Mel Gibson’s Passion” in Criterion 43:2 (Spring 2004): 20–27, and
37–38.
49 Here the exemplar would be the 1984 “Morning in America” television advertising campaign for Ronald Reagan, famous for its soft-
focus, sunlit images of an idyllic America: morning scenes, smiling citizens raising American flags, and young children’s glowing faces.
According to a recent piece by George Raine on the campaign, “The thinking was that positive and poetic would trump crass and demeaning.”
A possible component of the campaign’s success, he claims, was the fact that “it was not what people expected political advertising to
be—nasty and combative.” Instead, according to Republican strategist Dan Schnur, Hal Riney (the principle writer for the ad campaign)
“ha[d] the ability to cloak a strong message inside of a softer approach. … Most political advertising hits viewers over the head, while his
work ma[de] just as strong a point but in a less confrontational and a more soothing manner.” George Raine, “Creating Reagan's Image:
S.F. Ad Man Riney Helped Secure him a Second Term,” San Francisco Chronicle (June 9, 2004).
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be of a “brave [member] of the U.S. military
head[ing] out to defend our freedom,” the connection
is hard to deny.
But what about Thomas Kinkade? The Lord Bless
This Defender of Freedom figurine presents merely
the functional distillate of the Kinkade phenomenon.
Though Kinkade’s products (so far as I have seen)
do not participate in infantilizing adult figures, his
licensed “collectibles” do have a toy-like quality,
and his brand, especially when considered in toto,
carries out the function of the figurine to a much
greater degree. Asmentioned before, his entire brand
engulfs almost all aspects of domestic life, up to and
including the house itself. Kinkade’s brand offers
the hope of not merely decorating one’s home with
a canvas-textured print of a cozy Kinkade village
which evokes a mythical bygone era of safety and
Christian values, but the possibility of actually living
in a cozy Kinkade village which evokes (or claims
to evoke) a mythical bygone era of safety and
Christian values.50Given also that the present admin-
istration is cloaking its foreign policy in the rhetoric
of a mythical bygone era of safety and Christian
values, a rhetoric which also aggressively pursues
the synthesis of consumerism with Christianity and
patriotism, an administration that has made it all but
impossible to photograph and disseminate photo-
graphs of the returning caskets from Iraq and Afgh-
anistan, the functional kinship between Kinkade’s
product and the wider political landscape become
easier to see. In Kinkade’s world, it seems, the warm,
glowing light which seems to soak into everything
falls upon no caskets of America’s fallen, illuminates
no detainees who have suffered “extraordinary
rendition,” reveals no American pre-emptive strikes.
And what’s wrong with that? Danto worries that
one might precipitously write off the possibility of
a place for beauty in art because of a concern with
what he calls the artistic “sentimentalization of suf-
fering,” where “the use of beauty is perverse” be-
cause it “is not a consolation but a relish, a device
for enhancing the appetite, for taking pleasure in the
spectacle of suffering.” He argues for a legitimate
role for beauty in art when it functions as an elegy,
or, in another example, when it creates a hedonistic
medieval garden—a garden of love—from
whose precincts everything inconsistent with
the atmosphere of beauty has been walled off.
To be in the presence of a Matisse is to look
into that garden and to be in the presence
of—the embodiment of—the spirit of that
garden: a fragment of the earthly paradise. But
what precisely is wrong with creating a place
of beauty in a bad world? Matisse certainly
knew what the world is like.51
But what if the wider social function of the artwork
is precisely to help prevent one from ever remember-
ing—or possibly even becoming aware of—“what
the world is like” in the first place? What if that
function is to allow one to construct a religio-patriot-
ic fantasy so that uncomfortable facts about one’s
national identity would not easily come to the fore?
In such a case, one does not simply create a garden
of repose away from the world, but seeks to forget
that a world outside the garden even exists. The
fundamental maneuver at play in this political kitsch
is that Burkean beauty itself covers up the elimina-
tion elsewhere of desperately needed Burkean beauty
and, simultaneously, the elimination of the compas-
sion that Burkean beauty is also supposed to foster.
Here political kitsch subverts the social function of
Burkean beauty.
The proposition that Burkean beauty can actually
undermine its own purpose may at first seem some-
what far-fetched. But pause to consider a parallel,
and not unrelated, case: the philosophy of freedom.
The political philosopher and social theorist Susan
Buck-Morss opens her stunning essay, “Hegel and
Haiti,” with this remark:
By the eighteenth century, slavery had become
the root metaphor of Western political philo-
sophy, connoting everything that was evil about
power relations. Freedom, its conceptual anti-
thesis, was considered by enlightenment
thinkers as the highest and universal political
value. Yet this political metaphor began to take
root at precisely the time that the economic
practice of slavery—the systematic, highly
sophisticated capitalist enslavement of
non-Europeans as a labor force in the colon-
ies—was increasing quantitatively and intensi-
fying qualitatively to the point that by the mid-
eighteenth century it came to underwrite the
entire economic system of theWest, paradoxic-
ally facilitating the global spread of the very
Enlightenment ideals that were in such funda-
mental contradiction to it.52
She documents this fundamental contradiction in the
national identity of four Western countries—the
Netherlands, Britain, France, and the United
States—a contradiction affecting not merely their
national identities, but even the theories of their most
50 According to Schroeder, that hope may not be fulfilled by the actual housing development. Schroeder, “Aesthetics Awry,” pp. 93–95.
See also Janelle Brown, “Ticky-Tacky Houses from the Painter of Light ,” Salon (March 13, 2002).
51 Danto, The Abuse of Beauty, p. 114–115.
52 Susan Buck-Morss, “Hegel and Haiti,” Critical Inquiry 26:4 (Summer 2000): 821–865.
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celebrated political philosophers, from Locke to
Rousseau.53
Lest one believe that these are hoary old examples
from an irrelevant past, Buck-Morss also shows how
these very same contradictions inform the academic
output of entire disciplines right up to the present
day, contradictions that rest on a systematic “schol-
arly blindness that … silences the past.”54 She clari-
fies:
If this paradox [of a philosophy of universal
freedom which is able to gloss over a global
system of slavery] did not seem to trouble the
logical consciousness of contemporaries, it is
perhaps more surprising that present-day
writers, while fully cognizant of the facts, are
still capable of constructing Western histories
as coherent narratives of human freedom. The
reasons do not need to be intentional. When
national histories are conceived as self-con-
tained, or when the separate aspects of history
are treated in disciplinary isolation,
counterevidence is pushed to the margins as ir-
relevant.55
By this point, the connections to “political kitsch”
should be clear: turning to the present context for
political kitsch, we are faced with a fundamental
contradiction. On the one hand, we see a fervent de-
sire on the part of many Americans to believe their
nation embodies a “coherent narrative of human
freedom” that their President puts into these words:
“From the day of our Founding, we have proclaimed
that every man and woman on this earth has rights,
and dignity, and matchless value, because they bear
the image of the Maker of Heaven and earth.”56 On
the other hand, the executive branch of their own
government is carrying out an indefinite extrajudicial
confinement of its own citizens under a de facto
waiver of habeas corpus, carrying out the kidnapping
and “extraordinary rendition” of foreign citizens
around the world, and carrying out the torture of
randomly collected prisoners in Iraq, sometimes to
the point of death—none of which, to put it mildly,
speaks to any concern for their being made in “the
image of the Maker of Heaven and earth.”
As Buck-Morss points out, the elimination of un-
comfortable counterevidence to the national narrative
of freedom need not be intentional; it will happen
almost of its own accord. But intentional or not, it
would certainly be eased by an iconography accord-
ing to which American soldiers are child-like “de-
fenders of freedom,” the United States a country
whose flag is simply America’s Pride or The Light
of Freedom, and whose homes always throw awarm,
“timeless” light over pristine village snowbanks. In
the case of Thomas Kinkade, the ideal in question is
that—for those who can afford it—one can disappear
completely into an a-historical “religious Christian”
brand, a commercially licensed gated community.57
When considering Thomas Kinkade’s Christian
fantasies or the unsettling Lord Bless This Defender
of Freedom “collectibles,” one may begin to have
some sympathy for Richard Egenter’s diatribes
against the satanic evil of kitsch. What this political
kitsch—the dangerous potential within traditional
kitsch—involves, however, is not direct evil, but an
indirect evil, a sin of omission: the oblivious masking
of true evil elsewhere. Hegel once complained that
the citizens of Leipzig decorated their breakingwheel
with flowers.58 In our case, the flower blocks the
view of torture altogether.
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